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Abstract 
 
While there has been much interest in the apparent benefits of empathy in improving 
outcomes of medical care, there is continuing concern over the philosophical nature of 
empathy. We suggest that part of the difficulty in coming-to-terms with empathy is due to 
the modernist dichotomies that have structured Western medical discourse, such that 
doctor and patient, knower and known, cognitive and emotional, subject and object, are 
situated in oppositional terms, with the result that such accounts cannot coherently 
encompass an emotional doctor, or a patient as knower, or empathy as other than a 
possession or a trait. This paper explores what, by contrast, a radical critique of the 
Cartesian worldview, in the form of a Deleuzian theoretical framework, would open up in 
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new perspectives on empathy. We extend the framework of emotional geography to ask 
what happens when people are affected by empathy. We suggest that doctors and patients 
might be more productively understood as embodied subjects that are configured in their 
capacities by how they are affected by singular ‘events’ of empathy. We sketch out how the 
Deleuzean framework would make sense of these contention and identify some possible 
implications for medical education and practice.  
 
Introduction 
 
Empathy is widely acknowledged to be of great importance to the practice of medicine. It is 
considered to be an intrinsic good in itself – something that patients crave, a crucial 
responsiveness to the existential and psychosocial aspects of illness1- which, for many 
patients, may be the most significant features of illness2. Empathy is also considered to 
confer numerous instrumental benefits in medical practice. It facilitates doctor-patient 
communication and enhances mutual trust, producing a positive self-reinforcing cycle that 
can improve shared decision making, alert physicians to physical and psychosocial factors 
that affect diagnosis and treatment decisions, and help patients to comply with treatment 
regimens and develop positive health practices3 4. Empathy is good for doctors as well as 
patients. It can help avoid unpleasant or hostile interactions with patients and it confers 
significant satisfaction in relation to therapeutic goals5. 
 
There is substantial evidence, indeed, that empathy may produce positive therapeutic 
effects directly, and not merely by its facilitation of good communication and hence more 
effective medical care. Empathy has long been considered a key component of treatment in 
many psychotherapeutic traditions6 7. There is now extensive evidence about how significant 
positive human relationships are for all aspects of good health: such evidence has emerged, 
for example, in studies of child development, social determinants of health, neuroscience, 
and clinical care7; empathy is part, and possibly the key to, this strong association. There is 
certainly evidence that empathy produces therapeutic ‘context’ (aka ‘placebo’) effects, often 
very powerful ones. That is, empathy can directly produce therapeutic benefit. In some 
cases these effects have observable physiological mechanisms and correlates7. For example, 
there is recent evidence that empathic doctoring influences various physiological markers in 
patients with type II diabetes8. 
 
However, the importance of empathy in medicine and health care is at present matched by 
a very extensive scholarly literature on empathy in health and medicine (and beyond), that 
upon inspection proves to be philosophically vexed, internally contradictory, and subject to 
significant critique over the past decade4 9-11. Its vexations have been comprehensively 
examined elsewhere; here we are most concerned with the question of how empathy can 
be defined (if at all), and by corollary, whether empathy is either truly possible or desirable.  
 
To summarise a large literature briefly: for most (though not all) scholars, empathy is 
something more than simply feeling ‘sorry for’ a patient; it is considered to be about 
‘understanding’ that patient’s unique experience. But what that understanding consists of – 
literal neuronal replication or ‘mirroring’12? ‘emotional resonance’13? – and how we come by 
it has been at issue. Can one person (the doctor) ever ‘feel with’ or directly ‘share’ the 
subjective experience of the patient, as suggested by some of the more dominant 
formulations of empathy11? Or is one limited to listening and observing and imagining, in 
part from analogies and models, the qualities of another’s experience14? These questions are 
of some moment for doctors, who wish neither to project their own assumptions onto their 
patients’ experiences, nor to get the information wrong, and hence make an incorrect 
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judgment about diagnosis or treatment. As a result, some accounts see empathy as a 
predominantly or solely cognitive response, while others view it as intrinsically emotional. 
Similarly some insist that empathy is distinctive because it grants direct access to another’s 
experience (and hence, may be measured for its accuracy), while others argue that it 
necessarily involves imagination and analysis.  
 
This paper seeks to address the problems with empathy ‘in theory’ by foregrounding the 
affective reality of medical consultations. Using insights from affect theory and some of the 
more recent developments in the understanding of human subjectivity in the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari we approach the problem of empathy from a different place; one 
intentionally situated in the affective reality of consultation. Such a stance allows us to move 
beyond the pre-given or ideal forms of doctor and patient that can be seen to overly define 
the possibilities of what happens in medical encounters.  In doing so we hope to suggest a 
different theory of empathy that will allow more practically useful definitions of empathy to 
emerge and thus enable further research into improving health encounters.  
 
 
Empathy and the problems of modernity 
 
Following Reidar Pedersen, Rebecca Garden and others, we argue that an underlying and 
problematic discursive structure unifies these apparently disparate and oppositional 
accounts: they are all structured by the polarized dichotomies between subject and object, 
knower and known, mind and body, active and passive, science and society, culture and 
nature, (and masculine and feminine) that underpin modernity4 7. Thus all these accounts 
reproduce the ideals of objectivity and neutrality in medicine, such that the subjectivity of 
the doctor, who is supposed to be both objective and neutral, is constantly elided, while the 
subjectivity of the patient is brought into view14. Similarly all these accounts construct 
empathic knowing as oppositional to, and hence needing to be kept in check by, the 
technical knowledge of medicine. In this way what empathy allows a doctor to understand is 
never anything about disease itself, or the patient’s physical functioning; empathy is 
directed towards understanding the psychosocial and emotional elements of patient 
experience (which may impinge on treatment success, and so are worth attention). Our 
accounts of empathy construct cognition and emotion as distinct polar opposites; while 
empathy allows the latter a place in medical practice, it constrains that place so that it does 
not disrupt the ideals of objectivity, disembodied knowing and neutrality. 
 
If, then we find that medical students and young doctors regularly lose empathy, we should 
not be surprised. It is because the sort of empathy they can have is of the constrained kind 
that occurs in a discourse in which technical knowledge and affective care are constructed as 
opposites and where being emotional, and having subjectivity (and a body) requires taking a 
subject position antithetical to that which defines the doctor. Or to say it in plainer 
language: so long as medicine is so fundamentally conceived around these dichotomies, only 
a weak and incoherent form of empathy will be available to us. The fact that empathy can 
(apparently) produce physiological change – something utterly inexplicable in the terms of 
current literature on empathy – is a practical demonstration of how both false and limiting 
these dichotomies are.  
 
We would like to comment here on four additional issues associated with the proposition 
that it is medicine’s conceptual allegiance to the ideological distinctions of modernity that so 
problematize current accounts of empathy. The first is to call attention to the relevance of 
Foucauldian perspectives for empathy in medicine, a point also raised briefly by Rebecca 
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Garden in her critiques of narrative medicine more generally9. Foucault’s concept of ‘the 
gaze’ (le regard) and on the forms of power produced by the clinic has been a critical 
perspective on the practice and knowledge of biomedicine for some decades15. The ‘gaze’ 
describes medical ways of knowing that posit the doctor in the position of observer of the 
patient and his/her disease. This positioning objectifies the patient – that is, it produces the 
patient as the object of knowledge, a passive thing to be known; it is dehumanizing, 
separating the patient’s body from his or her personhood, and rendering it available to be 
manipulated and known. At the same time the doctor becomes invisible, positioned at the 
point from which things are seen and known, what Donna Haraway called a ‘view from 
nowhere’16.  
 
Empathy has been constructed as a means of bridging the gaze. But by using empathy as a 
way to ‘add on’ the ‘psychosocial’ dimensions of illness – the idea of ‘adding on’ implies that 
these are both separate and marginal to the biomedical aspects of illness – this version of 
empathy instead to reproduces the gaze, with its distributing capacity to mark out both the 
subject and the object, the gazer and the seen17. The gaze objectifies; empathy cannot 
rescue the patient from objectification, it just adds some colour to the object. Garden warns 
that narrative medicine, which sets out to critique the objectifying and reductionist qualities 
of biomedicine and to cultivate capacities for empathy in doctors, may often be just another 
form through which the doctor can come to regard the patient: the patient becomes a 
spectacle of suffering through which the doctor can demonstrate their virtue, commanding 
and sometimes appropriating the patient’s story11. Empathy may become a tool by which 
the doctor can exercise power - pastoral power, enacted with and through the patient by 
constructing them as a confessional subject, in need of medical understanding18. This is 
productive power, not repressive power, but it is nonetheless as constraining as it is 
enabling. Thus, we suggest that the Gaze overdetermines empathy, and this is a problem 
because it is of questionable ethics and works against the autonomy that empathy is 
nominally trying to give extension to. 
 
The second issue is that our conceptions of empathy have been fairly static and abstract 
entities. The metaphors we use matter for how we are able to conceive of things, and in 
accounts so far, empathy has been mostly imagined as a possession. Empathy either exists 
or it doesn’t; doctors ‘have’ it or they don’t; it is a cargo, or a level that may be measured; it 
is a set of mirror neurons, perhaps. This static conception of empathy doesn’t allow us to 
understand much about what changes when doctors ‘have’ empathy. Where does it come 
from – and how does it shift interactions and produce effects? Static models, or those that 
reduce the explanation to neurotransmitters, don’t tell us much about how empathy is 
experienced in patient encounters or what happens between the parties involved, and this 
insight is key for understanding, beyond a warm fuzzy glow, why empathy might matter.  
 
The third issue is that what is missing in all these accounts of empathy are bodies: the body 
of the empathizing doctor is entirely absent, while the body of the sick patient is considered 
relevant to the technicalities of medicine, but not to empathy. The doctor may have 
empathic understanding of the patient’s physical suffering or sensation, but neither feeling 
body is theorized as part of what empathy is or how it occurs.  
 
The fourth issue also concerns what accounts of empathy leave out. Currently empathy is 
understood in an entirely decontextualized fashion: as something germane to the 
interactions between a doctor and a patient, but not as something influenced by the time, 
location, space, or other aspects of the event. Empathy is thus separated from health 
services, hospital rooms, the epistemology of diagnoses, and all the other elements that 
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were necessary to the two actors coming together. Yet the reality is that patient experience 
is heavily influenced by all these factors, and that what is soothed by empathy is rarely 
simply the experience of a pathology, but rather the pathology as a located lived experience, 
embedded in and produced by the set of institutions and social structures in which the 
patient is enmeshed.  
 
In what follows, therefore, we take Pedersen’s and Garden’s critiques of empathy seriously. 
We are interested in a theory of empathy that can engage with the specificities of the 
context in which it occurs. We are stimulated by Pedersen’s emphasis on the importance of 
hermeneutics in the doctor-patient encounter, and by Garden’s consciousness of the ways in 
which both that encounter and the notions of suffering and illness and virtuous action that 
structure it are discursively constituted. And we want a theory that can accommodate the 
many quotidian elements that are critical parts of health care experience.  
 
We think ‘empathy’ might seem like a very different phenomenon if detached from 
modernist constructions of medicine and indeed (as we suggest below) of subjectivity itself. 
Retheorising empathy in this way would be an interesting project for its own sake. But we’re 
also interested because of what insights into therapeutic interaction a less constrained 
version of empathy might open up. Here we’d like to recognise affective reality as primary to 
medical interactions, not just an add-on to the business of physiological intervention.  
 
Nor are we the only ones; very recent scholarship on empathy in medicine has similarly 
looked for innovations that could circumvent the problematic polarisations between 
cognition and emotion particularly. A critical shift that many of these works have made is to 
cease thinking of empathy as something we have and to being thinking of it as something we 
do. Thus several recent psychologically-based models of empathy incorporate affective, 
cognitive and behavioural elements, and draw out – literally – processes for how empathy 
occurs, mapping the pathways that link these elements4 19 20. Others have suggested that we 
understand empathy performatively, as something we enact, in ways very like – or the same 
as – emotional labour19. While these models do not disrupt or jettison polarities (but merely 
distribute where they are in the model and specify connections), this shift from having to 
doing, from static to dynamic models of empathy, open up many new possibilities and 
insights.  
 
We find this shift compelling and see a rich resource in the humanities that would enable 
further exploration of what empathy means in medical encounters. One of us has extended 
the application of a phenomenological approach to empathy4, appropriate in part because 
the concept originated in this philosophical context.  Along the phenomenological line it may 
also be interesting to explore what a Satrean account of emotion could open up in our 
insights into empathy21. 
 
Here we add another possible version of it – a turn toward the more process oriented 
theories and philosophers of the past half century, as expanded by Gilles Deleuze22 and also 
with his collaborator Felix Guattari23. In comparison with Michel Foucault, other Continental 
philosophers in the postmodern tradition have had surprisingly little attention within the 
medical humanities despite their enormous impact in the humanities in general24; though 
perhaps this is unsurprising, given the challenge that poststructuralist and postmodern 
positions pose to the canon of classic liberal arts education that has been so central in the 
medical humanities to date. Here we try out what those who start from a deliberately anti-
Cartesian position can offer us in a novel theorization of empathy. We draw specifically upon 
affect theory and emotional geography. These theorists understand affects, that which is 
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"more than and less than rational"25, as productive entities, an approach that can be traced 
to a resurgent interest in Spinozan affects26. At minimum, we argue that this perspective 
offers a way of understanding empathy that attends to its dynamic and transitory 
emergence in the specificities of health care: a located, embodied and performative empathy 
(or empathies); one sensible of its hermeneutics, and one in which both subjectivities are 
important. These are all key dimensions of empathy that become ‘invisible’ in other 
accounts.  
 
 
A different approach 
 
Let us begin with an illustration – an illustration of the ‘old’ concept of medical empathy. In 
his seminal paper on empathy in medicine, one of the early pieces of thought-provoking 
interest and advocacy that stimulated research and commentary in the area more than 
twenty years ago27, Howard Spiro relates an anecdote in which young doctors joke callously 
about a comatose elderly man until they see a card on the wall near his bed, saying ‘get well 
soon Grandpa’. This silences them: the patient is jerked from being a passive, physical object 
defined in terms of the workload and resources it demands, and in terms of the ineffective 
systems of medical care, suddenly back into personhood. The child’s love and grief become 
the focal point of a much more reverent response. (Or so we infer from the bare bones of 
this story). This, says Spiro, is empathy – at least for the child, if not quite for the patient. 
The cargo of empathy (his term) with which these students entered the study of medicine 
has been slowly jettisoned as a result of the cultivation of distance and dispassion through 
practices such as dissection and pathology and the weariness of residency – that is, through 
the objectifying gaze; but in this moment, a little of that cargo gets hauled back from the 
deep. 
 
At first glance, this anecdote, and the paper that surrounds it, illustrate our contentions 
above: in it empathy goes mostly undefined, but is considered as a possession; it lets in 
emotion, but in no way disrupts or connects with the technicalities of medicine. But the 
important part of this anecdote is not what characteristics the students ‘have’. It’s what 
happens that is important: that something changes. And to understand that, we have to 
start with how we understand the selves involved. We have to start by retheorising 
subjectivity.  
 
Becoming equal to what happens in theory: rethinking subjectivity 
 
While we may feel empathic happening as an affecting force, becoming sensible to what 
happened is helped by (we suggest: requires us) to turn away from the ‘rational’ ‘cognitive’ 
approaches often associated with Cartesian and neo-Kantian thought. (Of course these days 
there are those who theorise both rationality and cognition in non-Cartesian, multivalent 
ways, but the dominant modernist paradigm that construes rationality and cognition as 
opposite to emotion strongly persists in much medical and scientific discourse). Affect 
theorists made just this turn28. We suggest that we use the traditions of affect theory to help 
us see what happens in empathy. This is no easy move to make given the ubiquity of such 
rationalist cognitive approaches in western cultures. However we feel that it is a necessary 
one in order to see what changes if we use it to allow a different version of the reality of 
empathy to come into view.  
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Theorising affect is often seen to require staking an alternative position to established ideas 
of mind and body. Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) famously rejected Descartes’ mind/body 
dualism, insisting rather that mind and the body ought to be understood as one thing29. He 
also saw personhood dynamically, as something that changed over time, and he framed 
personhood in terms of actions, rather than in terms of qualities or possessions.  Similarly, 
David Hume’s claim—that many of our emotional states arise from intersubjectivity (that is, 
arise from our engagement with others rather than being solely internally founded)—
suggests that possibility that we could productively think about consciousness or existence 
in terms of continually evolving emotional transference constantly shaped by, and shaping, 
its context14. The first difficult move here is that affect theory sees subjectivity as contingent. 
It is not a thing. It is, itself, dynamic and constantly being produced.  
  
For affect theorists the body is not merely influenced after the fact by affectedness, which is 
how earlier versions of empathy would have it. You have a feeling (say, of identification with 
a patient), it affects you. Affect theorists go further and suggest that a body is determined in 
its capacities by how it is affected. A body’s capacities are also not things, but are also 
dynamic and constantly being produced; they are, therefore, transient. Such ideas challenge 
deeply held ideas of self and subjectivity that are dominant in both medical and broader 
western cultural models.  
 
Ideas of the self, and how a self relates to other selves, have long been predicated on the 
assumption that a conscious complete human precedes any interaction that follows. Affect 
theorists put forward an alternative to this limited view of selfhood when they suggest that 
the self is contingent upon interactions of embodied selves with both other human and non-
human entities. A leading theorist of affect, Brian Massumi puts it thus: “The human is 
fractalized. It is dispersed across the nodes and transversed by them all in the endless 
complexity of relay”30.  
 
To understand this, we, like Massumi, will use Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s 
philosophical perspective to think about subjectivity. Together with his collaborator 
Guattari, Deleuze’s philosophical project was to build a metaphysics that matched 
developments in twentieth century science and society. This was, for him, a philosophy of 
difference24 31-33. This constantly-dynamic metaphysics is anti- foundationalist. In it, the 
concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance: things do not simply ‘exist’, they are 
dynamic, multiplicitous, transient entities. Similarly, event replaces essence and virtuality 
replaces possibility. In this philosophy, difference –the difference between self and self, 
between human and table or between any other two things, is no longer an empirical 
relation, because the things are not considered to have a prior existence. Instead, difference 
becomes a transcendental principle that constitutes the sufficient reason for empirical 
diversity. Thus, for example, it is the difference of electrical potential between cloud and 
ground that constitutes the sufficient reason of the phenomenon of lightning24; as it is the 
tendency to minimize difference in free energy that constitutes sufficient reason for the 
emergence of both surface tension minimizing bubbles from soap molecules, and bond 
energy minimizing crystals from sodium chloride solution34. 
 
A key conceptual term developed by Deleuze and Guattari is that of the ‘Body without 
Organs (BwO)’ to describe a primordial undifferentiated deeper reality underlying a whole 
that is constructed from parts. Traditional concepts of subjectivity, such as a doctor and a 
patient, give us the doctor and the patient as stable, separate identities and entities31. But 
these entities are really composed of sets of flows: ‘this body without organs is permeated 
by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic 
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singularities, by mad or transitory particles’23; they are always being reformed. The BwO 
does not pertain only to specific individual bodies (or persons), but also refers to the virtual 
dimension of reality (or ‘plane of immanence’), in general. This can be thought of as an 
infinite reservoir of all potentials for material being – sentient or otherwise. 
 
As a description of subjectivity, Deleuze and Guattari separate the pure affected body - the 
Body without Organs (BwO) - from the fixedly determined identity of any particular human 
organism. The BwO is traversed by intensities, is affected and affecting, is capable of 
achieving extension through human and non-human entities, is always becoming, and never 
quite fixedly human30. There is an inter-penetration of psychic experience and forces of 
society and nature31. By contrast, a body with organs is the transiently fixed body with a 
limited set of traits, habits, movements, affects, etc. In an elegant paper, Nick Fox has 
illustrated the utility of this perspective for medicine31. For example, it implies that we might 
allow the identity of the doctor and patient to remain unfixed, and instead, to be contingent 
upon a dynamic struggle of territorializing and de-territorializing effects of different psychic, 
biochemical, social and natural forces. That it is to say, diagnoses, medical discourses, 
different pharmacotherapies, cancer cells, etc, each reconfigure – transiently – the entities 
we call ‘a doctor’ and ‘a patient’. Such a dynamic understanding of personhood opens up 
how we see doing and being a doctor and patient; we can see where these transient entities 
emerge from and what in turn emerges next. This perspective also allows us to consider 
those aspects of empathy that are conspicuously missing in theory to date. 
 
But then how do we understand empathy – or perhaps we should say, but how then is 
empathy produced (is productive) - in the mileu of these deconstructed bodies, or in medical 
coming-togethers? Theorizing affect means giving a logical consistency to30 or, becoming 
equal to35, the in-between. We repeat that Deleuze’s critique of the dominant philosophy of 
Plato, Descartes and Kant was that “intensive differences are subordinated to the extensive 
structures…they give rise to”36. That is, identity subsumed the processes that produced it. 
Similarly, we suggest that it is useful to see the intensive aspects of empathy as having been 
subsumed by their end product, conceptually speaking. That is, what we have seen is only 
the end product - the patient/doctor dyad – and not the processes of empathy as producing 
this product. Thus ‘old’ versions of empathy have mistakenly ascribed the capacity of 
empathy to affect change to this end product, that is, to a doctor-self whose response to a 
patient shifts their therapeutic relation. Now, instead of looking at stable identities that 
change because of empathy, we are looking at empathy as a thing that transiently produces 
these identities in particular ways. 
 
Becoming equal to what happens in theory: emotional geographies of empathy 
 
In this section we wish to outline a strategy that will allow an increasing awareness of the 
specific ways that context and bodies can be said to ‘interpenetrate’ to produce events of 
empathy.  Firstly, we define empathy as excessive. Time and again affect theorists 
emphasise Spinoza’s observation of the excessive nature of affects; that is, affects exceed 
what is, spill over, are productive. Exactly what affects are excessive to is the ideal or 
complete idea of things.  “What the complete determination lacks is the whole set of 
relations belonging to actual existence”22. In the particular case of empathy, the idea of the 
patient and the doctor have been central in predetermining the possibilities of empathy, a 
move that is counter to the actual and singular events through which empathy occurs. The 
set of relations that empathy implies meets this criteria of excess when they change things 
in consultation, by bringing new and unexpected directions or possibilities to the flow of the 
interaction. 
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Secondly we define empathy not as an essential type or class of thing, but as unique 
emergences that are time and space dependent. If we think about empathy as singular 
events of empathy, or empathies, we again expose the limits of dominant theories.  
Empathy that is felt in consultation, cannot be understood in its excessiveness while 
retaining “the Kantian imperative to understand the conditions of possible experience as if 
from outside and above”30. Singular empathies are better understood in terms of the ‘plane 
of immanence’ (above), part of general reality. The idea of singular empathies also allows us 
to take account of the significant affective context in which these empathies emerge.  
 
Thirdly, we must have a way of coming to terms with the real existence of empathy in the 
milieu of medical coming-togethers. As we have seen, medical literature is plagued by 
metaphors of empathy as trait, level or quality (of a subject). But once we take a Deleuzean 
approach to subjectivity, these metaphors become meaningless. Instead, a Deleuzean 
approach would treat empathies, not as emotions or experiences, but as real material 
entities, part of the vast infinite reservoir of the virtual. The reader may well ask: in what 
sense can an entity like empathy be real? surely not as real as a doctor and a patient, or a 
scalpel?  But in the Deleuzean framework, the doctor, patient and scalpel are not ‘real’ 
either, in the sense of fixed entities that then have or create a moment of ‘empathy’; they 
are sets of flows, transiently produced by their difference from one another. Deleuze’s 
framework gives entities like empathy (and diagnoses, and cancer cells, etc) an equal 
ontological status – they are all temporary configurations, produced by and productive of 
forms of difference - that enables us to catch a glimpse of how empathy might actually work.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari developed a distinction between the possible and real, on one hand, 
and the virtual and actual on the other22. It is this insight that will allow us to consider 
empathies as real. The ‘possible’ is that which is an idea (or essence) that may achieve real 
expression in matter and which Deleuze rejects in favour of the ‘real’, which he split into the 
virtual - entities that really exist and are capable of divergent actualization - and the actual, 
that which we experience36. We understand that singular empathies emerge from a 
consultation space that is prior, or at least simultaneous, to the identities of doctor and 
patient. In this sense empathy can become more than a (non-real) ideal, but be appreciated 
as real, singular, emergent (like a soap bubble) and having the capacity to configure affective 
space; to actualize specific ‘points of inflection’22. It is not that empathy changes what is 
possible for doctors and patients to achieve in medical consultation, but more radically, 
singular empathies produce particular doctor-bodies and patient-bodies by making them 
actual (that which we experience) through its operation.  
 
Let us now re-examine Spiro’s example of empathy. Firstly, Spiro’s empathy is an event 
which includes the intensities of the card and its linguistic and aesthetic content, the shared 
understanding of the junior doctors on seeing it, the contagion of shame that is jointly felt 
and multiplied presumably by the simultaneous recognition of affectedness between the 
bodies of the doctors, and which stands in such contrast to the jovial nature of the group in 
the moments prior; and all this in the presence of a body-patient; a man incapacitated and 
made an object of pity. This event of empathy can therefore be defined spatially; by the 
dimensions of different intensities operating across bodies. 
 
Secondly, this event of empathy is singular and emergent. That is not to say that this 
particular event, one may wish to categorise it as one of shame, is not repeatable in type (it 
is always possible to categorise). But it is more usefully conceived of as emerging from and 
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shaping its context; the circulation of affects across bodies participating in this medical 
‘coming-together’. 
 
Thirdly, the empathy described by Spiro is productive: it changes things. Whether it actually 
reflects a real event or is purely fictional, it affects us. If fictional, it remains an expression of 
the affectedness of the author who, like the little boy penning a get-well card, is overflowing 
affectedness through the technology of the written word. Assuming it is a valid account of a 
real event, we can see how it reconfigures the bodies of the rounding doctors. It changes 
their behaviours in the moments, minutes, hours after the event, and perhaps even goes on 
to reconfigure their behaviours in their lives or medical careers. Whatever it did, the 
empathy event was transformative and productive and divergent, and presumably was told 
to Spiro and then written and communicated in such a way that the medical community 
could share in the felt experience (and…). Such is the capacity of the singular empathy in its 
excess to actualize difference from a virtual space. Empathies of this type defy capture in a 
static idea, but are continually expanding, affecting, ever outward. 
 
Our task in understanding empathy is, therefore, not to discover a generic category of 
configuration that we can seek to replicate and reproduce in order to continue the 
discursive work of medicine23. Instead, our task in understanding empathy is “much more 
singularly, endeavouring to configure a body and its affect/affectedness”26.  
 
This means becoming more aware of the affective reality of the consultation space that 
medical encounters occupy, as well as exploring the experience of medical subjectivities. As 
such we suggest conceiving of the affective aspects of empathy not as products of a discrete 
subjectivity, but as emerging within an ‘emotional geography’35 37 of bodies becoming 
‘empathied’. Such a conception is useful in that it implies a transpersonal consistency of 
affect that is open to bodies and capable of divergent actualization22 36. Furthermore the 
concept of an emotional geography takes us away from the limitations of conceiving of 
empathy as a possession or as a limited action by a subject. Instead, empathy can now be 
conceived of as an emergence within a topological consistency that is capable of folding, 
flowing, having points of inflection; that is at times experienced as closed or impassable, or 
characterised by striations and limits, and at other times experienced as open and smooth 
leading to lines of flight23 38. Subjectivities are defined not in isolation, but from within and 
against the forces of these affecting spaces and their linguistic, physiological and non-human 
extensions39. Singular empathies emerge and re-emerge across a real virtual space, 
continually redefining the space of consultations. Such an emotional geography can include 
all that is affected and affects the consultation space including doctors, patient, card, 
journals, medical language and communities, in short all that becomes enmeshed in the 
affectivity of the event. Not only do empathies change the content of the consultation, they 
can also change the parameters of consultation itself, which perhaps explains why we find 
empathy so powerful in medicine. In contradistinction to the classical doctor/patient dyad, 
which are – as we have seen – reproduced as separate and hierarchical in classical versions 
of empathy, affective empathies suggest a trans-subjective geography of interaction where 
overlapping subjects infold context and change the virtual space which they inhabit and lead 
to divergent actualization. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that existing models of medical empathy suppose a pre-existing and 
separated doctor and patient who are thought to interact through limited mechanism of 
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communication: either body language, written or vocalised language. This model of empathy 
has always made intersubjectivity a dubious proposition. Further, in traditional accounts of 
empathy, emotions are troublesome - either suppressed in the pursuit of detachment 
(doctor) or subjected to inquiry (patient) for the goal of understanding. Such a limited 
construction is continually challenged by the actual empathic affectivity that is broadly 
acknowledged to be felt in medical consultations.  
 
Our understanding of affects suggest that the reality of singular empathy events would be 
excessive to this determination, that it would affect bodies, inserting itself into consultations 
when bodies come together in a given context. Such a reality is beyond the conception of 
classical metaphysics. As one of us has argued elsewhere, empathy unavoidably suggests a 
critique of the dualities of subject and object, cognitive and visceral, patient and doctor4. 
 
Importantly this account of affect is compatible with neurological capacities of individuals to 
mirror or anticipate others emotions, to learn behaviours, to enfold cultural fixings, or to 
have been shaped by evolutionary mechanisms whereby certain reactions or affective states 
may be ‘imprinted’40 in bodies. It does not deny that contexts affect the way empathy 
operates in a clinical consultation. Instead, a theory of affective empathies allows for the 
possibilities of all of the above complexities of medical contexts to operate via bodies 
coming-together. In Deleuzean language, we might say that residual traces of previous 
experience are in-folded within and territorialize the BwO, but are enacted and produced in 
singular ways during consultation where the BwO is affected anew. 
 
For medical students and doctors, their educators and organisers who are hoping to 
‘increase’ empathy, this view of affective empathy has significant implications.  While some 
empathies may involve doctors seeking to cognitively convey empathy (for example, by 
reproducing certain acts or words that may convey it41), we suggest that the student of 
empathy needs to avoid presupposing what kind of empathy may be conveyed and the 
manner in which this may occur. Instead, and simply, we need to be open to becoming 
affected. A multiplicity of empathies is possible in a given situation, as there is a multiplicity 
of ways that a body can affect and be affected. Thus promoting empathy may mean taking 
measures to ensure that the doctor and patient are affectively present, to reduce affective 
states that might impede affective engagement (anxiety, stress, inattention, depression) and 
to allow medical students and doctors (probably unquantifiable) ways of being that are open 
to affectedness. This enables us to be cognizant of the multiple aspects of a situation – the 
space of a treatment or consulting room, the wearing of protective equipment, the ways in 
which note taking procedures disrupt or facilitate conversation, down to the subtle minutiae 
of tone, glance and touch – in which empathy might emerge and how it might affect us.   
 
Bodies may benefit from developing their capacities to affect and to become affected.  
Activities such as reading fiction42 or attending the theatre43 have been suggested as ways to 
increase an individual’s empathy.  We would however revise the interpretation of these 
findings and say that if such activities improve empathy, they would do so by configuring 
bodies toward being affected  (rather than a mechanism of cognitive ‘simulation’ of the 
other). Rather than increasing an individual’s ‘empathy complement’, such activities 
enhance a body’s capacities to affect and be affected, opening them to shared affective 
states that cannot be separated from their emotional context (the theatre experience itself, 
where and how and why literature is experienced). It is the continuity of affect, the 
emotional geographies in art and life that form the space of affectivity, the BwO, from which 
individual empathies can then arise when bodies come together. Future research could 
consider the organisation of health around emotional geographies (in addition to existing 
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arrangements in which flow of capital, or the abstractions of organs, or disease hierarchies 
can often determine the structure of health ‘systems’) or connect empathy theory with 
medical, architectural and cultural research identifying places of healing.  
 
We have outlined two projects here.  The first, following from critique of medical empathy in 
the literature is to sketch a theory of empathy through affect, one that takes into account 
the excessive capacity of empathy to change medical subjects and objects. The second and 
simultaneous project is to use the reality of empathy to further contribute to the affective 
turn and challenge existing ideology around the self and in particular medicalized bodies. 
Even those unpersuaded by the full extent of the positions outlined here may appreciate, by 
force of contrast, how different it is to understand empathy as transitory, performative, and 
dynamic, as opposed to static or purely cognitive; how different it is to understand the 
empathy as affecting and producing affects in others, as productive and hence active; to see 
how the body is intrinsic to empathy, one primary way one can be affected. Our application 
of a Deleuzean framework here is very much merely a beginning; a full Deleuzean 
theorisation together with its implications for practice may find many possibilities not 
discussed here. These new vistas are enticing. Empathy as located, embodied, performative, 
and productive – these are novel and very productive features of empathy to bring into 
view.  
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